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Can a Photograph Lie? Remedies for an Age of Image Alteration
Joshua S. Fischer*
I. Introduction
As a craft, journalism should be held to the most strict standards of professionalism and
accuracy. When journalists Jacques Steinberg and Steven Reddicliffe were referred to as "attack
dog" and "on the attack," respectively, their photos had been digitally abused, as can be seen in
Figure 1 below. In terms of the distortions themselves, "the journalists' teeth had been yellowed,
their facial features exaggerated, and portions of Reddicliffe's hair moved further back on his
head. Fox News gave no indication that the photos had been altered." 1
Figure 1-Fox News Distorts Steinberg and Reddicliffe photos

The photos depicted above are exactly the type of photos that need to be prohibited from
publication.

The distortions, while subtle, certainly show how easily photographs can be

manipulated to suit the publisher's needs. As this comment will demonstrate, Steinberg and

*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, University ofDelaware. The author
would like to thank Professor Frank Pasquale for providing the inspiration for this note as well as providing valuable
insight into its organization and substance.
1
Fox News Airs Altered Photos ofNY Times_Reporters, MEDIAMATIERS FOR AMERICA (July 2, 2008), available at
http:l/mediamatters.org/research/200807020002.
2 !d.

1

Reddicliffe are not the only victims to have their photos distorted. 3 Today, the use of digital
manipulation is increasing exponentially, and it is time to put forth a means of protection for
those victims of digital manipulation.
Generally speaking, a photograph is a means to capture a moment in time in its most
authentic form. 4 Unfortunately, the desire to capture the truth is being outweighed by a desire to
make sure that the photo depicts exactly what the capturer wants the image to depict. As a result,
the use of truthful photographs in print and online media is on the decline, and the use of
distorted or doctored photographs is on the rise. 5 The prevalence of altered photographs in the
media has even prompted a new term that American youth now use frequently: "Photoshop
Fail."6 The means by which photos are manipulated and distributed are as simple as clicking the
mouse on a computer or moving your finger on a tablet. Although these photos can be the result
of harmless fun, there are those who overstep their boundaries and proceed to distort images so
badly that they cause embarrassment and shame to the subject.

These victims need better

protection, and they should be able to achieve that protection through stronger defamation laws.
The victims of these distorted images should have the opportunity to bring causes of
action for defamation because they belong to the group of people which defamation laws were

3

See infra Section II.A., Figures 2-5.
See Joel Snyder & Neil Walsh Allen, Photography, Vision, and Representation, 2 CRITICAL INQUIRY 143, 144
(citing Peter Hemy Emerson, Naturalistic Photography for Students ofthe Art (1889) Emerson believed that the aim
of photography was "naturalistic representation." Emerson believed that photos should be a ''representation
of a scene in such a way as to be, as much as possible, identical with the visual impression an observer would
get at the actual spot from which the photograph was made.")
5
See generally Airbrushing, THE HUFFINGTON POST (examples detailing celebrity "photoshop fails'' in various
magazines), available at http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/news/airbrushing.
4

6

Id
2

designed to protect. 7 Originally, the tort of defamation mainly dealt with words, either spoken or
written. 8 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that:
to create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c)
fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication. 9
Certain doctored or altered photographs should be treated the same as defamatory verbal
lies because photos can be extremely damaging, and can subject victims to "hatred, ridicule or
contempt."

10

By distorting a picture and making it available for others to see, the publisher

easily produces a risk of shame or ridicule on the part of the subject of the photograph. The
victims of certain distorted photographs should be able to bring actions for defamation because,
according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "a communication is defamatory if it tends so to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him." 11

The photographs of Steinberg and

Reddicliff, as displayed above, undoubtedly damaged the journalists' reputations, not just by
words, but by the distortion of their photographs on national television. The Restatement has
made an effort to expand the definition of defamation by viewing broadcasters of radio or
television media in the same light as newspaper publishers:
the wide dissemination that results from broadcasting over radio and television,
together with the prestige and potential effect upon the public mind of a
standardized means of publication that many people tend automatically to accept
as conveying truth, are such as to put the broadcaster upon the same footing as the
publisher of a newspaper. 12
7

But see the landmark decision N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which severely weakened the tort of
defamation and perhaps led to the propensity of courts to favor First Amendment rights over the possibility of hurt
feelings.
8
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 558 (1977)
9
!d. (emphasis added).
10
Restatement (Second) of Torts at§ 559 cmt. b (1977).
11
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 559 (1977).
12
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 568A cmt. a. (1977).
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts lists three potential defenses that could block causes
of action for defamation. 13 The most powerful defense to prevent any defamation action is a true
statement of fact. 14 Specifically, "[t]here can be no recovery in defamation for a statement of
fact that is true, although the statement is made for no good purpose and is inspired by ill will
toward the person about whom it is published and is made solely for the purpose of harming
him." 15 Some states do offer a cause of action for defamation where a publisher produces a true

statement, but with malicious motives. 16 As a result of this defense, this note will only focus
on-and differentiate between-images that lie and images that satirize.

If the image is

objectively satirical or meant to be a parody, a cause of action for defamation by distorted
photograph will not be allowed to continue. 17
The second defense in the Restatement (Second) is consent: ''the consent of another to the
publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for
defamation." 18 This comment will delve deeper into the issue of consent by examining the ways
in which publishers use releases to ensure that they can use the photos in whichever manner they
see fit. 19 One of the policy reasons for stronger defamation laws is to prevent publishers from
taking advantage of subjects of photographs. 20

13

The third defense addresses the issue of

These defenses include True Statement of Fact (Restatement (Second) of Torts §582), Absolute Privilege
Irrespective of Consent (Restatment (Second) of Torts§§ 585-592A), as well as Conditional Privileges
(Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 593--605A).
14
See Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 582.
15
Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 581A cmt. a (1977).
16 Id
17
See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal
Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law ofSearch, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1149, 1189
(2008) (concluding that statements of "opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a
Erovably false factual connotation" are "immunized from defamation liability").
8
Restatement (Second) of Torts §583 (1977).
19
See infra Part IV.
20 ld.
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"privilege. " 21 An "absolute privilege" is better classified as a type of immunity for those people
who have attained a certain status or position to allow them to publish defamatory materials?2
The Restatement (Second) also addresses conditional privileges in§§ 593-612. This comment
will not address the privilege defense.
It is questionable whether the authors of the Restatement (Second) ever envisioned the
technological advances that presently exist to subject someone to defamation. In fact, these
developments have severely impacted the ways in which photos are digitally altered and shared.
Barbara E. Savedoff expresses her concerns regarding digital alteration of photographs:
When we add to the enhanced ease and power of alteration the possibility of
simulating photographically realistic components on computer, it appears that the
"photographer" has gained complete control over the image and has acquired the
freedom of the painter to depict whatever he or she can imagine.23
Savedoff explains that digital alterations have now become seemingly undetectable to the
untrained eye: "when we look at the reproduction of what seems to be a straight photograph, it
will become more and more difficult to be confident that no manipulation has taken place."24
Most viewers will not even wonder whether a photo is a true and accurate representation. "Our
implicit faith in the veracity of the photographic image is deeply ingrained."25 Thus, the only
person that might be able to discern that their photo has been enhanced is the victim of an
already-distorted photograph. These victims need to be afforded the opportunity to bring a cause
of action for defamation by distorted photograph when the photo is such an alarming
misrepresentation so as to cause that person shame and embarrassment.

21

See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§585-592A (1977).
/d.
Barbara E. Savedoff, Escaping Reality: Digital Imagery and the Resources ofPhotography, 55 JOURNAL OF
AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM 201,210 (Spring 1997), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/431264.
24
/d. at 211; (See also discussion regarding software that can detect photo manipulation discussed in Part II.A, infra.
This software serves as an important development in the ultimate determination of photo manipulation.).
25
/d. at 212.

22
23
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This shame and embarrassment can also degrade reputations. According to David Ardia,
"[r]eputation is an emergent property of these interactions. It serves an important signaling
function by communicating complex information about the individual and about the individual's
place within society. When an individual's reputation is improperly maligned, it degrades the
value and reliability of this information and devalues community identity. " 26 In a professional
world, many people take years to build their name in order to ensure that they project an honest
and true image of themselves. It is alarming to think that the media holds that reputation in the
palm of their hands, should a distorted photo land in their laps. 27 "Reputation serves an essential
function by communicating complex information about individuals and their places within
society.

By projecting the repercussions of actions into the future, it makes altruistic,

cooperative social interactions possible. "28
This comment will examine the avenues that exist to afford victims specific protection.
Allowing these actions to go unheard is in direct conflict with reasonable expectations about the
protection of our own images. Part II will differentiate between images that lie and images that
satirize in order to demonstrate which causes of action can pass through our court system. Part
III will diagnose the First Amendment issues that often arise when discussing defamation issues
through analysis of cases in which the First Amendment defense was favored. Part IV will
explain the policy reasons for punishing the distribution of lying images, including the selfvaluation of our own image, the desire for sensationalism in the media and the use of unfair
"authorized" releases. Part V will offer plausible legal solutions to the defamation victims by

26

DavidS. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Foundations ofDefamation Law, 45 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. REV. 261, 262 (2010).
27

See generally Stephanie Rosenbloom, Got Twitter? You've Been Scored, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 20 11, SR8
(presenting a new program to detennine a person's level of influence. Once this program is put in place, and a score
is generated, ''your rating could help detennine how well you are treated by everyone with whom you interact").
28
!d. at 269.
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distorted photograph by calling on the courts to adopt older case precedent and by calling on the
legislature to reform the Lanham Act by adding a Right of Publicity claim. Part VI will conclude
by explaining that there is hope for those who have suffered damage to their image as a result of
distorted photographs.
II. Images that Lie Versus Images that Satirize
A. What is a 'Lying Image'?
An image can pierce that objective-observer threshold and become a 'lying image' when

it is an untrue or inaccurate representation of who or what it purports to be. The image presented
in Part I, supra is just one of these egregious examples. The following cases demonstrate how
courts have been willing to accept actions for defamation based on altered photographs.

In Myers v. Afro-American Publishing Co., Myers successfully pursued an action for libel
against the defendant publisher for publishing photographs of her with touched-up outlines?9
The outlines accentuated her semi-nudity, which was plainly against her wishes, as well as
"deceptive and derogatory of the plaintiffs professional attainments as a dancer." 30 The court
held-similar to the rule from the Restatement (Second) of Torts-that "a photograph or
pictorial representation tending to expose the subject to public ridicule or contempt is libelous."31
In Russell v. Marboro Books, the plaintiff fashion model participated in a photo shoot to be the
face of the defendant bookstore's new educational book section. 32 The bookstore then sent the
photos to Springs, a bed sheet manufacturer, where the photos were retouched and altered
negatively to juxtapose the plaintiff in an awkward photograph with an elderly man. 33 The court
held that plaintiff was defamed by Springs, and Marboro by extension, because "she was
29

5 N.Y.S.2d 223,224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
Id
31 Id
32
183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
33
/dat17.
3o

7

humiliated, distressed, held up to public contempt and exposed to the hazard of loss of clients
and earnings."34
In Kiesau v. Bantz, the defendant created and distributed an altered photograph of the
plaintiff in which plaintiff was purportedly "exposing her breasts in front of a squad car."35 The
court held that "[a] person could easily verify the truth or falsity of the altered photograph by a
simple inquiry of Kiesau." 36 Also, "Bantz did not publish the altered photograph in any political
context. He sent the altered photo to fellow employees without any disclaimer." 37 The plaintiff
was entitled to damages because the photograph was libelous per se. 38 In Morsette v. "The Final
Call", plaintiff's picture was altered in a newspaper article to make it appear that she was a
convict wearing prison attire. 39

The court held that the defendant "was guilty of a gross

departure from the standards of responsible journalism when, without plaintifrs permission, it
removed her picture from its files and altered it to indicate she was a convict. " 40
Russell, Marboro and Kiesau demonstrate an early recognition of the issues that result
from the publication of false photographs. In so holding, it was clear that the courts recognized
the danger that attached to the publication of photos that can damage one's reputation. If the
courts were able to recognize the damage that can be done without the technological
advancements we have today, it should behoove the legislature and the judiciary to protect those
affected. 41 The photo in Morsette is a prime example of the falsity that should be punished, and
the plaintiffs that should be protected, following the publication of an altered photo.

/d.
686 N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 2004).
36
/d. at 177.
37 !d.
38 /d.
39
309 A.D.2d 249, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
40
!d. at 253.
41
See infra Part V.
34

35
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That being said, publishers should have an obligation to put forth true images without any
distortions so as to preserve the reputation of their subjects and to maintain integrity in their
profession. As noted above, courts have been receptive to causes of actions for certain lying
images, but the amount of protection should be greater than past protection due to the expansion
of technology and ease of manipulation discussed in Part I, supra. In fact, the American Medical
Association has adopted a new policy against advertisers that "commonly alter photographs to
enhance the appearance of models' bodies", adding that "such alterations can contribute to
unrealistic expectations of appropriate body image."42 Savedoff presents an alarming example of
this proposition in the work of photographer Pedro Meyer. 43 She explained that Meyer wanted to
show the "striking dignity" of a beauty pageant contestant "who was noticeably overweight in
comparison with her rivals."44 Meyer could not find the correct juxtaposition in his photos, so he
chose to create it through digital manipulation. 45 This manipulation would change the way in
which the viewer would perceive the pageant contestant, perhaps not in a way she imagined. 46
Similar examples of manipulation have been found recently in magazines and
advertisements. Recently, Julia Roberts was the subject of a Lancome advertisement. 47 Roberts'
photo was severely airbrushed, so much so that the advertisement was removed from the
campaign following complaints by British politician Jo Swinson.48

42

AMA Adopts New Policies at Annual Meeting, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 21, 201 I), available at
http://www .ama-assn.org/amalpub/news/news/a 11-new-policies.page.
43
Savedoff, supra note 23, at 213
44 !d.
45 !d.
46 !d.
47
Mark Sweeney, L'Oreal's Julia Roberts and Christy Turlington ad campaigns banned, THE GUARDIAN (July 27,
20 11), available at http://www.guardian.eo.uk/media/20 11/jul/27/loreal-julia-roberts-ad-banned#.
48 !d.

9

Figure 2. L'Oreal Advertisement Banned to Due to Excessive Airbrushing

Although the changes to the photographs are less subtle than in Figure 1) one can
certainly understand why the advertisements were banned.
Roberts' face appear fake and unrealistic.

The advertisement made Julia

Although Lancome is a makeup company) the

advertisement should reflect reality of applying their products, not an improbable transformation.
A reasonable person can clearly see the differences between the two photos and reach the same
conclusion: the doctored photos are easy examples of lying images.
The February 1, 2010 issue of OK! Magazine featured Kourtney Kardashian on the cover
in an attempt to display her "too-good-to-be-true" body after she had just given birth. 50 In
reality) the Huffington Post reported that "OK! lopped off Kourtney's stomach and replaced her
face with a slimmer one to illustrate her speedy weight loss." 51

Kardashian explained the

untruthfulness of the cover photo to Women's Wear Daily: the "magazine 'doctored and

49

Photoshopped Ads Banned in Britain, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, available at

http://pdnpulse.com/20 11/08/photoshoppedwadswbannedwinwbritain.html (last visited Mar. 24, 20 12).; Second photo
available at http://www.blogcdn.com/main.stylelist.com/media/2009/12/julia-robertswlancome-ambassador.jpg (last
visited Mar. 23, 2012).
5
°Kourtney Kardashian: OK! Photoshopped My Post-Baby Body, HUFFINGTONPOST (Jan. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/0l/25/kourtney-kardashian-ok-ph_n_436008.html.
51 Id

10

Photo shopped my body to make it look like I had lost all the weight, which I have not. "'52 The
photograph published in the magazine was indeed false and should not have been published.
Figure 3. Ok! Magazine Removes Kourtney's Pregnancy Bump

Additonally, the egregiously altered image of O.J. Simpson on the cover of Time
Magazine following his 'not guilty' verdict in 1994 portrayed Simpson in a much darker light. 54
The image displays Simpson's mug shot, but much darker and more blurry so as to make him
appear more sinister, and perhaps guilty. 55 Time changed an already sinister mug shot into a
completely inaccurate representation of the actual photograph.
Figure 4. Time Magazine Makes O.J. Simpson Look Guiltier

52
53
54

/d.
/d.

Sherry Ricciardi, Distorted Picture, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW (Aug./Sept.
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~hick0088/classes/csci_210 1/ojcovers.gif.

55
56

!d.
available at http://www.tc.umn.edu/~hick0088/classes/csci_210 1/ojcovers.gif.
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2007), available at

Lastly, and most recently, the New York City Department of Health digitally altered a
photo of Cleo Berry to make it appear as if he had one leg, and subsequently used the photo as
part of an anti -diabetes campaign. 57
Figure 5. Diabetes Campaign Subject Appears to be Missing a Leg

8

After seeing the photograph, Berry stated that he cried at his computer screen, and was deeply
concerned about how it would affect his acting career. 59 Berry further stated that he was "willing
to seek professional revenge, offering to lower his usual acting rate to any soda companies who
might want to use his unaltered image in one of their campaigns. " 60 After viewing the abovementioned photos, one should begin to understand the types of photos that deserve protection.
Recent technological developments might be able to afford the relief and protection that
is so desired by celebrities and average citizens alike. Dr. Hany Farid and Eric Kee, a professor
of computer science and a Ph.D. student in computer science at Dartmouth College, respectively,

57

Eric Pfeiffer, Actor "beyond shocked" after seeing leg amputated in altered ad, Yahoo! News, Jan. 30,2012,
available at http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/sideshow/actor-beyond-shocked-ad-altered-Ieg-appear-amputated173035069.html.
58 ld
59 ld
6o Id
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"are proposing a software tool for measuring how much fashion and beauty photos have been
altered, a 1-to-5 scale that distinguishes the infinitesimal from the fantastic." 61 The idea behind
this software can extremely beneficial.
[T]he interests of advertisers, publishers, and consumers may be protected by
providing a perceptually meaningful rating of the amount by which a person's
appearance has been digitally altered. When published alongside a photo, such a
rating can inform consumers of how much a photo has strayed from reality, and
can also inform photo editors of exaggerated and perhaps unintended alterations
to a person's appearance. 62
Because of the danger of altering photos "beyond recognition" this software can be helpful in
identifying the degree to which the photo has been distorted. Arguably, the most extreme cases
can be prime examples for actions based on defamation by photograph should the subject decide
to pursue it. Conversely, those victims of slightly altered photos will probably not be able to
bring said claim.
B. What is a Satirical Image?
One of the reasons why courts might be hesitant to favor plaintiffs in distorted-photo
cases is because it is difficult to draw the line between what is a lie and what is satirical. In its
plainest language, a satirical image is a picture that is not meant to be a truthful representation,
but rather a farce. 63 It is an image that ridicules a designated idea or person in society.64
According to Gilbert Highet, a satire contains three significant parts:
1) it describes "a painful or absurd situation or a foolish or wicked person or
group as vividly as possible"; 2) it uses sharply critical language including
callous, crude, obscene or taboo words in order to shock and disturb the reader;

61

Steve Lohr, Retouched or Not? A Tool to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,2011, atBI.
Eric Kee & Hany Farid, A Perceptual Metric for Photo Retouching, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, Early Edition, Oct. 19, 20 II, at 1.
63
See Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law ofLibel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies
Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REv. 923,924 (1985) (defming satire as a "potent form of social commentary which
attempts to expose the foibles and follies of society in direct, biting, critical and often harsh language-tempered by
humor.'l
64 !d.

62
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and 3) it attempts to evoke an emotion in the reader which blends amusement and
contempt, hatred and laughter. 65
Figure 6. Modern Political Satire

SOCIALISM
MASTERFUllY CRAFTED FOR ut~DERACHIEVERS

66

Satirical images have been around for centuries, and serve as a way for individuals to poke fun at
society. These images become problematic, however, when those opinions are attempted to be
passed off as real images. One of the most important determinations a court will make in any
defamation suit is whether the statement or image is a fact or an opinion.
The original test for determining whether a production was a fact or an opinion was set
down in Ollman v. Evans. 67 There, two nationally syndicated columnists published an article in
The Washington Post about Mr. Oilman, chastising Oilman for his Marxist teaching
tendencies. 68 The court held that Professor Ollman was not able to pursue his action for libel
because the piece published by the journalists was mere opinion, and not fact. 69 The test for
determining whether a published work was a fact or opinion was broken into four separate
rnqu1nes:
65

/d. (quoting Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy ofSatire, 16, 18-21 (1966)).
Photo available at http://www .zazzle.com/justrightwing/gifts?cg= 196936148270403642.
67
750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2662 (1985).
68 /d.
69 /d.
66
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(a) What is "the common usage or meaning of the specific language of the
challenged statement?"; (b) "Is the statement capable of being objectively
characterized as true or false?"; (c) What is the effect of the entire statement,
taken in its full context?; (d) In what setting does the statement appear? 70
Eventually, the court simplified the inquiry into one question: what is a reasonable interpretation
of the published image or statement? 71

In terms of satirical images, Harriette Dorsen presented a case in which a publishing
company produced an image of the beloved cartoon character, Eloise. 72 The original story
presented Eloise as a five-year-old girl living at the Plaza Hote1. 73 In the image in question, a
twenty-six-year-old Eloise was portrayed as an inhibition-less girl, writing graffiti on a mirror at
the Plaza Hotel, stating that Mr. Salamone, the manager of the hotel, was a child molester. 74 At
the time of the publication, there was a manager of the Plaza Hotel whose last name was
Salamone. 75 Eventually the complaint was dismissed because the plaintiff could not prove any
damage to his reputation, as required by New York law. 76 Dorsen argued that, more often than
not, satire will not cause any reputational injury because most are so farfetched that no objective
person would believe it to be true. 77 The logic then follows that if plaintiffs were able to pursue
actions for defamation based on hurt feelings, the amount of litigation would skyrocket and the

Id
Dorsen, supra note 63 at 935.
72
/d at 930 (citing Salamone v. Macmillan Publishing Co., 411 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), rev 'd. 429
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980)).
73 Id
74 Id
75 ld
76 Id
77
Dorsen supra note 63 at 938; (See also Frank Pasquale, Defamation by PhotoShop?, Concurring Opinions, Jul. 5,
2008, available at http://www .concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/07/defamation_by_p.html (questioning
whether the image in Part I, supra should be considered damaging, simply because the subjects are depicted as ugly.
Pasquale argues that "[t]he closer one looks at it, the more obvious it becomes that the proportions of the face are
impossible'').

7o
71
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courts would be backlogged for etemity. 78 To add to that notion) courts are often quick to
dismiss claims or find in favor of the publisher because images are objectively meant to be
opinion and not true or accurate representations. 79

This concept is demonstrated by the

following cases.
In Mink v. Knox, the student-run internet journal known as The Howling Pig published a
distorted photo of Professor Junius Peake of the University ofNorthem Colorado "wearing dark
sunglasses and a Hitler-like mustache." 80 The court held that this image was protected because
the "crass and vulgar)' words and images on the website were satirical. No reasonable person
would believe that this article with the accompanying photo was published to be factual. 81 In

McWeeney, MD. v. DuZan, MD., Dulan created an anti-smoking poster with a "computergenerated 'clip-art' cartoon of a cross-eyed man with dark circles around his eye, smoking eight
cigarettes."82 McWeeney believed the poster to be of him and filed a complaint for defamation
against Dulan. 83 The court held that "no reasonable person who saw the cartoon in the poster,
assuming they did consider it to be a caricature of McWeeney, would have understood it was
being anything other than hyperbole and opinion. " 84
In New Times, Inc. v. Isaaks, the Dallas Observer published a fake story in response to
the actions of District Attorney Isaaks and Judge Darlene Whitten in detaining a child in juvenile
hall for a fictional story he had written that involved "terroristic" activities. 85 Accompanying the
article was a satirical cartoon of a little girl with the caption "Do they make handcuffs this small?

78

Id

79

See e.g., infra notes 78, 80, 83.
613 FJd 995, 998 (lOth Cir. 2010)
81
Id at 1009.
82
McWeeney, M.D. v. Dulan, M.D., No. CA2003-03-036, 2004 WL 602306, at *I. (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
80

83
84
85

Id
Id at *3.

146 S.WJd 144, 148 (Tex. 2004).
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Beware of this little girl."86 The court ultimately held that the article's "general and intentionally
irreverent tone, its semi-regular publication of satire, as well as the satire's timing and
commentary on a then-existing controversy" would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
article was not fact, but rather, opinion. 87 The court clarified the relevant inquiry as to satirical
content by using the case Pring v. Penthouse Int 'l Ltd.: "whether the publication could be
reasonably understood as describing actual facts." 88 The above-mentioned cases demonstrate
that, in the eyes of the objective observer, a satirical image could never pass muster for a
defamation cause of action because no reasonable person would believe that the image was
meant to show fact. In fact, some courts might even go so far as to say that satire is one of the
most protected forms of expression under the First Amendment. 89
III. The First Amendment Hurdle
Before explaining the constitutional limitations on defamation claims, one needs to
distinguish the tort of"false light invasion of privacy." In order to proceed on a false light claim,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant "(1) gave publicity to (2) a matter concerning the
plaintiff (3) that placed the plaintiff before the public in a false light (4) that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and did so (5) with the reckless disregard of the falsity of the
matter and the false light."90 James Blake points out that, of the five elements required to bring a
false light claim, "[o]nly the false light's fourth element (offensiveness) seems materially
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88
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different from the corresponding element of defamation (defamatory meaning). 91

Blake

continues by adding that, "upon closer examination, even that difference largely disappears (at
least in any case claiming reputational injury) because a statement that imparts a defamatory
meaning is also likely to be found highly offensive."92 Rodney Smolla agrees with that notion
and points out the danger in allowing false light claims to continue: many plaintiffs attempt to
"circumvent the strict requirements of the law of defamation, requirements crafted to strike an
appropriate balance between protection of individual interests and the free flow of
infonnation."93 In terms of constitutional limitations on false light claims, Blake, as well as many
other scholars, 94 asserts that the Supreme Court opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, provides
the support for a First Amendment roadblock to so-called "novel theories to bypass
constitutional limits on libellaw."95
As the production of certain false images continues, causes of action for defamation by
distorted photograph will continue to enter our legal system. Unfortunately, these actions will
most likely be halted by the First Amendment "freedom of speech" clause, which has been
expanded to encompass "freedom of expression." 96 The Supreme Court weighed in on the First
Amendment issue in the landmark case, New York. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 91 There, the Court
stated that if a public figure or public official brings an action for defamation, he/she must prove
that the publication was made with actual malice, meaning "with knowledge that it was false or
91

/d. (citing Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2002), at 899-900; Jensen v. Sawyers, 130 P.3d 325,
3335-36 (Utah 2005).
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93
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on Freedom of Speech §24:3 (October 2011).
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95
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96
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opportunity for expression in all of its varied forms to convey a desired message" (citing Gaylord En1m't. Co. v.
Thompson, 958 P.2d 128 (Okla. 1998)).
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with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. " 98 It is safe to say that images are included
within the term "publication."99 Celebrities will most likely be able to prevail on the reckless
disregard claim because the publications (such as those mentioned above) are extremely different
from the true photographs. 100
When it comes to broadcast media, the Supreme Court held that cable operators are the
"gatekeepers" for television programming, and "the physical connection between the television
set and the cable network gives the cable operator . . . control over most (if not all) of the
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home." 101

In addition, ''the

owners of cable television systems select programming for their customers; hence, the Supreme
Court has deemed cable operators "speakers,'' cloaked with some First Amendment
protections." 102 This concept is scary for those who wish to keep their reputation intact. If the
Supreme Court is willing to afford so much protection to broadcast media, the amount of access
given to Internet domains might be even more broad. 103
An analysis of First Amendment issues would not be complete without fleshing out the

complexities that often arise when discussing the Internet. Due to the expansiveness of the
Internet and its limitless amount of publications, it will be difficult to control the spread of truly
false images. 104 The First Amendment will likely be implicated in this control due to everpresent defense of "freedom of expression." JoAnne Holman and Michael McGregor state that
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domain hosts all rely on the free flow of ideas, and it will be very difficult to restrict what they
are allowed to produce. 105 According to Holman and McGregor, "[i]t offers a true opportunity to
enable a diversity of voices to be heard. An analysis of the Internet as a commons suggests an
innovative framework for communications policy that takes the focus beyond old analogies and
existing regulatory regimes." 106 Norman Redlich and David Lurie point out that "the challenge
for courts and legislatures will be to recognize and define the rights and responsibilities of both
those who own and those who utilize the new 'superhighway.'" 107 Although the difficulties of
controlling Internet domains seem daunting, the Internet remains a form of communication and
form of speech. 108 It should be treated as such when false images crop up that do not represent
opinions, but instead seriously implicate a plaintiffs reputation.
Courts are already inclined to side with broadcast media due to their "gatekeeping"
abilities, and they will most likely err on the same side of caution in terms of Internet
publications. 109 The logic behind this is that the First Amendment casts a giant blanket over
most publications, and it is an easy way for courts to decide whether to let an action continue
through the court system. 110 The following cases demonstrate previous court rulings that have
struck down defamation by photo actions for First Amendment reasons.
In Thomas v. New World Communications, plaintiffs claimed that The Washington

Times' attempt to smear their anti-nuclear campaign resulted in defamation when the newspaper
published distorted photographs of their demonstrations. 111 The court held that the publications
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were opinion, and not fact, and thus protected under the First Amendment. 112 The court went
further to state that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas." 113 The court stated that the "harsh descriptions
of plaintiffs was 'being used in a metaphorical, exaggerated or even fantastic sense."' 114 In
Hallmark v. Gaylord, plaintiffs argued that a close-up camera shot of a hairline masonry crack in

one of their houses distorted the crack's actual size, making it appear that the masonry was done
poorly. 115 The court held that the close-up accurately represented the appearance of the crack
from the distance shown, and it was a part of a broadcast representing a reporter's opinion
regarding defects in the houses. 116 The statements and camera close-up were thus protected by
the First Amendment. 117
In both cases, the Court struck down the plaintiffs causes of action because the

defendants were simply asserting their opinions. 118 When those opinions are passed off as fact,
the courts must step in and rectify the damage done to the victims of the statement.
IV. Policy Reasons for Punishing Publication of Distorted Images
Despite these First Amendment hurdles, there are still many policy reasons to permit the
punishment of distorted images.

They include psychological implications, the desire for

"sensational" news stories outweighing the desire to produce the truth, and unfair advantage by
creators of releases for photographs.
A. Psychological Implications of Distorted Photographs
112/d.
113 !d.
114
!d. at 63
us 733 F.2d 1461, 1464 (lith. Cir. 1984).
ll6 !d.
117 !d.
118
See Thomas, supra note Ill at 61; Hallmark, supra note 115 at 1464.
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Imagine you are a famous fashion model and you have just completed your first photo
shoot for a magazine spread. In the best case scenario) your agent properly handled all of the
proceedings and your photo will only be used for the magazine. In the worst case scenario) the
publisher just emailed your photos to all the major editors. Within seconds, your photo was
completely manipulated to make it appear as though you are wearing a fur coat, walking down
Hollywood Boulevard. In a matter of moments) your proud reputation of standing up against
animal slaughter is ruined. Your good name is being besmirched by the papers and your career
is almost over as soon as it began. This all could have been prevented if your photo was not
altered or retouched to change how you look.
Consider the case of Braun v. Flynt. 119 There) the plaintiff worked at an amusement park
in San Marcos, Texas where she starred in a novelty act with "Ralph, the Diving Pig." "Pictures
and postcards were made of Ralph and Mrs. Braun's act ... and Mrs. Braun had signed a release
authorizing the use of the picture." 120 In that release) the amusement park agreed to use the
photos in good taste and without embarrassment to her and her family. 121 In 1977, an editor of

Chic, whose dominant theme is female nudity, called the amusement park's public relations
director and retrieved the negatives of the photographs. 122 He received the negatives only by
lying and telling the public relations director that Chic was a men's "fashion magazine." 123
Later, Mrs. Braun would find out that her picture wound up in the "Chic Thrills" section of the
magazine. 124 Although the magazine did not juxtapose her picture in a lewd fashion, it was found
alongside various obscene photographs and lewd articles. 125
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Although her photo was not distorted, she was still terrified at the thought of being
associated with the magazine to begin with. 126 In her testimony, she stated:
I was raised in a private Catholic school and I had never seen anything like this.
And I was terrified, I didn't know what he had in mind. I thought something
horrible was going to happen to me. He flipped through that book and my picture
was in that book. I didn't believe it. 127
The court ultimately found that this invasion of privacy was not warranted and that defamation
did indeed occur. 128 Although this is not a lying image case, it applies to the overall "defamation
by lying image" theme because, as the court explained, "publications alleged to constitute
invasions of privacy merit the same constitutional protections as do publications alleged to be
defamatory" 129 The court went on to explain that a
"false light" invasion of privacy action will often arise from the same
circumstances which yield a cause of action for defamation. Federal courts have
frequently noted the similarities between the two causes of action and have often
carried over elements of state defamation law into their consideration of falselight invasion actions. 130
As if damage to reputation was not enough, the subject of a distorted photograph would
most likely endure the awful embarrassment that comes from being judged by peers and the
surrounding community. As Andre Modigliani points out, "[a]t the psychological level the
capacity for embarrassment indicates that an individual's sense of adequacy can be sharply
affected by an awareness of how others in his immediate presence perceive him." 131 In the
above case, Mrs. Braun found out that her photo was featured in the magazine because a stranger
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identified her on the street.

132

She was most likely overcome with embarrassment at that very

moment, and her anxiety most likely continued as she pondered how many other people had seen
her and associated her with Chic magazine. 133 As Modigliani points out, it is a "sense of
vulnerability, of foolishness-as if negative attributes were "leaking out" through nonconscious,
deficient aspects of behavior and appearance." 134
B. Media Sensationalism and the Hunt for the Next Great Exclusive
Although reputations can slowly be rebuilt and mended within the community, the
moment that a distorted photograph is placed on a national media platform, no amount of
mending can help. 135 Today, television shows are glamorized so as to entertain and keep us
interested, and the more viewers equal more profit for the networks. 136
As an example, consider the media portrayal of juvenile violence in the 1990s. 137 In what
seemed to be a "moral panic," newscasters started using very strong language to dramatize the
events surrounding any case of juvenile violence, with special emphasis on juveniles "of
color." 138 The media portrayal of juvenile violence made it seem as though violence was on the
rise, when instead it was declining dramatically. 139 This example demonstrates the effect that
media can have on the general public. Moriearty states that, astoundingly, as a result of these
media portrayals, "white Americans substantially overestimated the likelihood of being
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victimized by a person of color" and "nearly twice as many . . . believed that they were more
likely to be victimized by a minority than a white perpetrator." 140 This led to an unnecessary rise

in public panic. "In its coverage of juvenile offending, the news media overwhelmingly relied
on a technique called 'episodic' framing- instead of placing an individual incident in its broader
statistical, political, or socioeconomic context, the news media frequently reported juvenile
offenses as discrete events." 141
As another example, consider the media portrayal of the insanity defense, as described by
Christopher J. Rauschera. 142 "[T]he media tends to portray the criminally insane as violent and
vicious characters who get 'off scot free."' Studies of the media show that the public is most
aware of the use of the insanity defense when invoked by high-profile murder defendants." 143
Rauschera argues that media portrayal of the insanity defense garners more media attention than
necessary due to the fact that the defense is used more rarely than the public believes. 144 In
addition the defense is often pleaded quietly, which demonstrates the amount of media influence
on a particular story. 145
Although the above-mentioned stories do not center on media manipulation of
photographs, they show how media bias can sway public perception of various topics.

Media

tools of over-emphasizing irrelevant facts and attaching pernicious labels to various subjects will
immediately trigger opinions in the minds of viewers. Until those viewers see something to
persuade them in the opposite direction, a majority of first impressions will stand. The danger is
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that "[e]lements of news and entertainment thus become inextricably intertwined, making it
impossible to draw a distinction that will protect private individuals from the risk of becoming
involuntary subjects of 'reality' television without impeding First Amendment protections for the
press. "

146

The examples listed in Part IIA supra indicate how easy it is to manipulate photos and

place them in the public spotlight. One of the ways that these distorted photos can reach the
public eye is through the use of unfair releases to obtain the photo, which the subject of the photo
authorizes.
C. Authorizing Release of Photographs Without Knowing Their Intended Use
As noted above, the fate of our photographs are in danger if they land in the wrong hands.
The question then becomes: what happens when the subjects of distorted photographs intend to
hand the photos over to a specific person, and that person betrays them by producing an untrue
reproduction? This demonstrates an important public policy question that can possibly result in
punishment for those that use distorted photographs following the authorization of such releases.
The following cases demonstrate examples of courts finding against plaintiffs due to the broad
context of their respective releases.
In Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., an athlete filed an action against the defendant
manufacturer and seller of beer and malt beverages. 147 There, the plaintiff was photographed in
a red shirt, holding a bowling ball, and without any other backdrop or props. 148 Eventually, the
picture was used for a beer commercial. 149 This caused plaintiff to suffer ridicule at games and
caused him to be worried about losing endorsements. 150 According to the court, Sharman signed
two releases, in which it permitted the company to use his picture in a "distorted character or
146
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form" and gave unrestricted rights to the use of the pictures." 151 The court went on to state that
"it was contemplated by all parties concerned that the picture would eventually be used for
commercial purposes." 152

The court ruled in the defendant's favor despite the plaintiffs

differing beliefs on what he and the defendant assented to. 153

In Spiegel v. Schulmann, plaintiff discovered that "an altered photograph of his torso was
being used in an unflattering manner in advertisements for defendant's 'Evolve' nutrition
program." 154 Plaintiff claimed that after the photo had been released, his colleagues mocked
him, and he therefore sought damages for defamation due to the publication of the photograph. 155
Plaintiff claimed that he anticipated that his photo would be used, but did not anticipate the
extent to which it would be altered. 156

The release that he signed contained no such

limitations. 157 The release stated
[t]hat he ... may be photographed, cast, involved and/or portrayed in what is
defined below as Promotional Material, to be broadcast and/or otherwise
disseminated into the public domain by TSK. The undersigned hereby agrees and
consents for all purposes, to the sale, reproduction and/or use in any manner of
any and all photographs, videos, films, audio, or any depiction or portrayal of the
undersigned or his ... likeness and/or voice whatsoever, with or without the use of
the undersigned's name (hereinafter, "Promotional Material") by TSK and by any
nominee or designee of TSK, including without limitation, any agency, client,
periodical or other publication, in all forms of media and in all manners, including
without limitation advertising, trade, display, editorial, art and exhibition. 158
The court ultimately held that "[s]ince there is no question as to very broad scope of Spiegel's
written consent, there is no genuine issue of material fact to be determined by a jury. Spiegel is
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not entitled to relief." 159
In Doe v. Young, Plaintiff received plastic surgery from defendants. 160 Defendants took
"before" and "after'' photos, and some of the after photos depicted Plaintiff in "full frontal and
posterior naked poses." 161 Plaintiff executed a release in which she "authorized a doctor" or a
representative to take photographs, slides, or videos" of her "for the following procedure(s) for
medical purposes to be used for my care, insurance predeterminations, medical presentations
and/or articles." 162 She declined to allow the defendants to use the photos for such things as an
office photo album or seminar, their website, in print advertisements or on television without
compensation.

163

Defendant attempted to use plaintiffs photos in the chapter of a text and in a

PowerPoint presentation, but Plaintiff threatened to sue each time. 164 Eventually, Plaintiffs
photos were used in an article in the Riverfront Times, which featured defendant plastic
surgeon. 165 Upon notice of the present suit by the plaintiff for invasion of privacy and unfair use
of her likeness, defendants filed for summary judgment. 166 The court found that defendants
could not prevail at the summary judgment phase because a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to the wrongness of defendant's use of plaintiffs photos. 167
In Miller v. Anheuser Busch, Plaintiff claimed that the "Defendant used and exploited the

image of Plaintiff in its nationwide commercial advertising campaign for Budweiser Beer"
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without her consent. 168

Plaintiff signed three separate releases, surrounding five separate

photos. 169 In the 2000 and 2001 Model Release, Plaintiff granted defendant "the absolute right
and permission to use my likeness and photograph, in whole or in part." 170 In the 2002 Model
Release, Plaintiff granted defendant "the right to use, publish and copyright my name, picture,
likeness and on-camera performance or portrayal with or without my name and/or fictitious
name in all forms of advertising and promotion. " 171 The court held that "plaintiff undisputedly
provided express consent for Defendant to use the five images at issue." 172
The above-stated cases demonstrate how courts often defer to the language of the
authorized releases, most likely due to the constitutional freedom of contract. 173 In Spiegel and
Scharmann, however, the courts should have been more deferential to the impact that these

photos caused on the respective plaintiffs. The courts offered no solace or sympathy for these
plaintiffs, and basically further articulated the rule: "always read before you sign." Despite this,
however, the Doe court clearly recognized the need to protect plaintiffs when the drafters of the
releases stepped out of line. 174 The law recognizes a valid contract when there is manifestation
of mutual assent. 175 When a victim of a false image sees that image in public, and the context in
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which it is presented is in direct contravention the authorized release, it is difficult to say that
there was mutual assent. The author proposes that if a release is drafted correctly) it should only
afford the use of a photograph for a limited window. The logic continues that, if the photo is
published in any way outside what is allowed in the release, the offended party should be
allowed to sue for breach of contract. Even if the release expressly allows the recipients of
photographs to grossly distort the photographs, the clause allowing such distortion should be
stricken from the agreement due to the objective standard of contracts. 176

Generally) no

reasonable person would agree to have their photo distorted without their consent. 177
V. Plausible Legal Solutions: Judicially and Legislatively
A. Reduce Recent Supreme Court Over-Protection of First Amendment Rights
The Roberts Court has been moving in a direction that would seem to deflate the general
proposition that publishers ought to be punished for producing distorted photographs. 178 Two
recent Supreme Court decisions come to mind that demonstrate a proclivity towards a stronger
protection of First Amendment rights:
In Snyder v. Phelps) members of the Westboro Baptist Church picketed near a soldier's
funeral service. 179 The picketers "displayed signs for about 30 minutes before the funeral began
and sang hymns and recited Bible verses." 180 Their message was that "the United States is
overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment." 181 In an attempt to
grapple with the Synder family's emotional distress and the constitutional rights of the Westboro

photo would be manipulated in such a way. Following this notion, either the whole contract should fail, or the clause
allowing the manipulation should fail.)
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Baptist Church, the Court held that "[g]iven that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a
matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to 'special protection' under the First
Amendment." 182

In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass 'n, the Supreme Court determined the validity
of a California law that restricted the "sale or rental of violent video games to minors. " 183 The
Court held that the law did not serve a compelling state interest that was narrowly tailored to
achieve that same interest. 184 "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,
video games communicate ideas-and even social messages-through many familiar literary
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium." 185
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, "appellant Citizens United, a
nonprofit corporation, released a documentary ... critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a
candidate for her party's Presidential nomination." 186 The documentary mention[ed] Senator
Clinton by name and depicts interviews with political commentators and other persons, most of
them quite critical of Senator Clinton. 187 Citizens United released the film on DVD and other
similar mediums, but wanted to increase the availability of the video via "video-on-demand." 188
Citizens United then produced advertisements to promote the film. 189 The question before the
Court was whether the ban on corporate independent expenditures violated the First
Amendment. 190

The Court held that the ban violated the First Amendment because the
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Government could not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's identity as a
nonprofit or for-profit corporation. 191
As demonstrated by the examples in Part ILB supra, publishers in print and online media
seem to be getting away with too much. Although many publishers are forced to take the
advertisements or articles down, it still does not solve the actual problem of the publishing of the
distorted photos themselves. Since Myers v. Afro-American Publication Co., many cases have
allowed plaintiffs to pursue actions for defamation based on images that are outright lies. 192 But
the moment that an intervening factor is introduced, such as a potential First Amendment issue or
an executed release authorizing the use of plaintiffs photographs, courts, more often than not,
will find in favor of the publishers.
Although freedom of speech and expression are fundamental rights, the altered photos
being produced can arguably be classified as "low-value" speech. If defamation laws were
extended to include distorted images that project a falsity, it would most likely be upheld because
false statements are categorically unprotected. 193

Perhaps one of the reasons why false

statements are considered to have such a low value is because of societal values in general. 194
The question then becomes: how can a person work towards a good reputation if there are
doctored or distorted pictures in view of the public that seriously harm that reputation? DavidS.
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Ardia points out that defamation law "faces practical impediments stemming from the law's
failure to account for how reputational information actually flows through our networked society
and to provide remedies that are embedded within these flows." 195 As of now, there has been
little to no relief for those that have suffered from a distorted and false photograph. False
statements have been considered categorically unprotected by the Supreme Court in the past, and
false images ought to be held in the same light. 196 Photographs often speak louder than words,
and therefore should carry on the ability to harm as well.
The current Supreme Court has made First Amendment protection a priority. 197 The
privilege of freedom of speech is lost, however, when words, or in this case, photos, are false. 198
Today, the threat of photos being manipulated, cropped, airbrushed, or altered are more prevalent
due to the advent of the use of Photo shop by publishers of print and online media. 199 The
Supreme Court should lower their First Amendment shields and look closely at the ease in which
overly-doctored photographs have spread throughout the country and how they damage the
reputation of their respective subjects.
If the Supreme Court has misgivings over this new tort of defamation by photograph,
perhaps the Court will consider a disclosure remedy as an alternative. In Cervantes v. Time, the
defendant published a salacious article about the then-mayor of St. Louis, Missouri, Alfonso
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Cervantes, who in turn sued for libel. 200 The mayor sought "an order to compel disclosure of the
identity of the informant[s]" who stated that the mayor had ties to gangsters that operated in St.
Louis?01 His reasons behind the compulsion of the order were as follows:
A disclosure enables the plaintiff to scrutinize the accuracy and balance of the
defendant's reporting and editorial processes; [b] through disclosure it is possible
to derive an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the factual data
forming the predicate for the news story in suit; [c] disclosure assists successful
determination of the extent to which independent verification of the published
materials was secured; and [d] disclosure is the sole means by which a libeled
plaintiff can effectively test the credibility of the news source, thereby
determining whether it can be said that the particular source is a perjurer, a wellknown libeler, or a person of such character that, if called as a witness, any jury
would likely conclude that a publisher relying on such a person's information does
so with reckless disregard for truth or falsity? 02
Although the court found in favor of the defendant,203 a disclosure remedy, revealing the source
of the manipulated photo would be beneficial because it would allow for the defendant to see if
there is a pattern of photo manipulation. Several courts have held that the First Amendment does
not grant reporters a privilege to withhold news sources, 204 but there still must be a proper
inquiry into the source of the photos themselves before claiming that the photo was manipulated
in a way that could cause reputational harm. 205
Disclosure is important as a matter of public policy because if "an allegedly libeled
plaintiff uncovers substantial evidence tending to show that the defendant's published assertions
are so inherently improbable that there are strong reasons to doubt the veracity of the defense
informant or the accuracy of his reports, the reasons favoring compulsory disclosure . . . should
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become more compelling." 206 The software discussed in notes 59 and 60, supra might be able to
lend a hand in this regard?07

If the software is developed successfully, it will provide a

relatively easy way to determine if the publisher is responsible for such alterations and if the
publisher continues to do so without regard to the reputation of the victims. For these reasons,
disclosure should be a fallback remedy for those victims that cannot find relief in the courts or
through the legislature.
B. Potential Legislative Impact
If the courts are less willing to adopt precedent that suggests protection of distorted and
lying images of private individuals, then it might be more beneficial to seek refuge in the
legislature. Rebecca Tushnet points out that "[b]ecause courts don't like to think about images,
and have few tools to deal with them, the temptation is to treat them as not requiring (or being
able to sustain) the interpretive energy the law devotes to words." 208 Today, the Trademark Act
of 1946-more commonly known as the Lanham Act-does not include a separate right of
publicity that would afford victims of distorted images protection for their true images. 209 It
does, however, provide a "cause of action against any person who falsely implies an 'affiliation,
connection or association' with a trademark holder, or causes confusion 'as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services or commercial activities. "'210

This

principle should be extended to include images that were distorted and passed off as the truth.
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The Lanham Act is focused on protecting reputations, consumers, and the public from lies, and
that purpose should continue to hold through a right of publicity claim.
A right of publicity claim is based on a person's desire to control the use of their identity
and likeness in the public forum. 211 Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A. Lemley argue that those who
use a name as a brand may not be entitled to protect other aspects of their personality, such as
their image or voice, under trademark law. 212 They go on to state that "noncelebrities, foreign
celebrities, and celebrities who refuse to trade on their name ought equally to be able to prevent
confusing or diluting uses of their names and likenesses."213 The question then becomes: what
needs to be produced before this claim can be brought forth? David Tan points out that "[s]ome
courts are prepared to find that the identity requirement is satisfied as long as a clear reference to
a celebrity has been evoked by an advertisement from which the defendant may gain a clear
commercial advantage."214 Tan continues by arguing that "[i]f the predominant purpose was to
make economic profits by exploiting the celebrity's fame, then the presence of artistic
expression-no matter how significant or transformative-should not be permitted to defeat a
right of publicity claim."215
It is clear from the depicted examples that advertisements and magazine covers will use a
celebrity's fame in order to draw consumers and readers, respectively. 216 The danger here, as
presented by Laura A. Heyman, is that "[b]y purporting to speak or act on behalf of the plaintiff
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(by, for example, associating her with a particular product or service against her wishes), the
defendant in a right of publicity case provides information to the plaintiffs audience that can
shape its perception of the plaintiff. " 217 For example, in the Lancome advertisement depicting
Julia Roberts, Ms. Roberts is seen by the public as endorsing Lancome's line of beauty
products? 18 When Roberts saw the advertisement, she inunediately demanded that it be taken
down because it was an unfair manipulation of her identity? 19 The photo in the advertisement
was so greatly exaggerated that Ms. Roberts could no longer be a part of it. 220 Her reputation
most likely was damaged because the public would see the advertisement and think that Ms.
Roberts would be a part of the advertisement campaign, regardless of her appearance. Heyman
adds that "the reputational interest is stronger where there is an implied assertion of at least
willful participation, if not endorsement, on the part of the plaintiff. " 221 A right of publicity
claim added to the Lanham Act, will afford the protection that many plaintiffs need in actions for
defamation by photo.
In terms of the commercial importance of this legislation, one of the requirements for
plaintiffs to bring a right of publicity claim is that the defendant has employed that person's
name or likeness in order to sell a product. 222 Today, most celebrities are happy to endorse many
products due to the lucrative contracts that most likely follow said endorsement. 223 The problem,
as mentioned above, is when the corporations that produce such products adopt a free license in
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changing the photographs attached to the advertisements.224 If the photograph is so grossly
distorted to appear to be a false representation of the person depicted, the subject should still be
allowed to bring a right of publicity claim, even after agreeing to endorse the product.
The First Amendment "freedom of expression" clause might be raised as a possible
defense if the above-mentioned proposed legislation is passed into law. According to the case
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.

[t]here is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of
freedom of expression under the First Amendment. This tension becomes
particularly acute when the person seeking to enforce the right is a famous actor,
athlete, politician, or otherwise famous person whose exploits, activities,
accomplishments, and personal life are subject to constant scrutiny and comment
in the public media. 225
Most defendants would claim that the work that they produced was merely their way of
displaying their product to the public.

"According to the Restatement, such uses are not

protected, however, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not
related to the identified person, and the privilege may be lost if the work contains substantial
falsifications. " 226 This legislation would carry forward if it were solely allowed when there was a
blatantly false image produced by the offending party.

As noted above, the forthcoming

software that can determine whether an image has been doctored can be of great help to any
plaintiff who wishes to bring a right of publicity claim due to an unwanted use of their likeness.
In the meantime, an objective standard of reasonableness can be used to determine whether there

are "substantial" falsifications in the photos presented in view of the public. 227
VI. Conclusion: There is Hope for Victims of Distorted Images
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As the above sections demonstrate, there is case law on point which will afford protection
to those whose images are grossly manipulated. 228 However, there are roadblocks which will not
allow certain plaintiffs to bring these actions. 229 Before the tort of defamation by photograph is
adopted, it needs to be reconciled with two very prominent areas of law: contract law and
constitutional law.
For those aspiring to place themselves into the limelight, there is an ever-present pressure
to sign at the dotted line when someone promises to make you famous. The potential for injury
here is limitless if someone truly does not understand what they are signing. If the contract states
that the photographer will be given broad discretion in handling the photographs, it is a cause for
concern. There should be room for negotiation in terms of what the photographer or publisher
can do with your photographs. A clause should be inserted into the contract detailing the limited
use of the photograph and how it will be inserted into the finished product. In terms of legal
implications of this issue, it is often difficult to escape the constitutional protection of contracts.
As stated above, one argument against the court's desire to err on the side of the contracting
parties is to state a lack of mutual assent. As a foundation of contract law, it is essential that there
be mutual assent before any agreement is reached. Arguably, when subjects of manipulated or
doctored photographs see the opposite of what was expected when they signed the contract, it
can be part of a claim for lack of mutual assent, or a breach of contract.
In terms of First Amendment protection, if the image is an absolute lie, the publishers
should not be able to claim "freedom of expression."23

° False statements and false publications

are categorically unprotected speech. 231 As stated above, categorically unprotected speech is
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often considered "low-value" because it is antithetical to what society values most. Defamation
laws were designed to protect the reputations of those implicated in the statement or publication.
Because society values reputations, the protection often given to statements ought to be extended
to photographs because of the similar potential impacts that both forms of communication carry.
The Supreme Court should relieve the grip that it has protecting the First Amendment and allow
a new type of defamation to enter the legal community. Photographs that are false can be
defamatory as long as they are not objectively meant to be satirical.
Public figures, such as celebrities need to prove that the picture was published with a
reckless disregard for the photo's possible falsity? 32 The author believes that this should be
easily proven by a simple side-by-side comparison. Airbrushing is rampant now in the celebrity
world. 233 Most celebrities that see that their photos are airbrushed ask that they be taken down.
They need to take this a step further because more often than not, it is too late. The victims
should either demand damages for destroying their reputation, or demand injunctive relief in the
form of an apology, one that is preferably larger than a footnote on the inside-back cover.
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